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AFTER “TOP GUN”: HOW DRONE STRIKES IMPACT THE
LAW OF WAR
LAURIE R. BLANK*
“We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in
planes. The next war may be fought by airplanes with no men in
them at all . . . . Take everything you‟ve learned about aviation in
war, throw it out the window, and let‟s go to work on tomorrow‟s
aviation. It will be different from anything the world has ever
seen.”
— General Henry H. ―Hap‖ Arnold
In 2010, the United States launched 118 drone strikes in
Pakistan, an exponential increase over past years.1 In a broader
view, in 2009, the U.S. Army reported a 400% increase in drone
flight hours over the previous ten years.2 Drones are regularly
used in combat operations in Afghanistan3 and Libya,4 and have

* Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University School
of Law.
1 See
2011:
The
Year
of
the
Drone,
NEW
AM.
FOUND.,
http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones/2011 (noting a total of nine U.S.
drone strikes in Pakistan from 2004–2007, compared to seventy such strikes in
2011).
2 See J.D. Leipold, Army to Increase Medevac Support, Add New CAB, More
UAVs, WWW.ARMY.MIL, Jan. 7, 2010, available at http://www.army.mil
/article/32603/ (discussing the military‘s efforts to increase armed
reconnaissance capabilities).
3 See, e.g., Christopher Drew, For Spying and Attacks, Drones Play a Growing
Role in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2010, at A6 (discussing the expansion of
the use of drones in Afghanistan).
4 See, e.g., Martha Raddatz, Pentagon Confirms First Predator Drone Strike in
Libya, ABCNEWS.COM, Apr. 23, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International
/pentagon-confirms-predator-drone-strike-libya/story?id=13442570 (confirming
a U.S. drone strike against Qadhafi‘s forces in Libya as the first U.S. drone strike
in that country).
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been used to launch targeted killings in Somalia5 and Yemen.6 The
most widely reported drone strike in 2011 was the killing of Anwar
Although
al-Awlaki in Yemen on September 30, 2011.7
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities make drones a
workhorse of modern intelligence gathering and targeting
determinations, public discourse and outcry have focused on the
so-called ―robots in the sky‖8 that launch aerial attacks on targets
within armed conflict and counterterrorism operations, forming a
central platform in United States operations from Pakistan to
Somalia. One major topic of debate and a steady source of news is
the number of civilian casualties from such strikes. Estimates of
the number of civilians killed in U.S. drone strikes over the past
several years vary wildly, with some reports in the thousands and
others in the hundreds.9 In contrast, the U.S. government recently
announced that Central Intelligence Agency (―CIA‖) drone strikes
in Pakistan have caused zero civilian casualties in the past year.10
The debate over civilian casualties goes far beyond war,
incorporating the morality of targeted killing, the viability of U.S.
5 See Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Expands its Drone War into Somalia,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2011, at A1 (discussing the expansion of drone strikes into
Somalia on a theory of collaboration between Islamic militants in Yemen and
Somalia).
6 See Siobhan Gorman & Adam Entous, CIA Plans Yemen Drone Strikes, WALL
ST.
J.,
June
14,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052702303848104576384051572679110.html (―The Central Intelligence
Agency is preparing to launch a secret program to kill al Qaeda militants in
Yemen . . . .‖).
7 See Dina Temple-Raston, Drone Strike Ends Hunt for Al-Qaida Leader, NPR,
Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/09/30/140958027/drone-strike-endshunt-for-al-qaida-leader (detailing a U.S. drone missile attack to kill Anwar alAwlaki while al-Awlaki travelled in a convoy of cars).
8 See Graeme Smith, Pakistan‟s Deadly Robots in the Sky, GLOBE AND MAIL,
Apr.
12,
2011,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/asiapacific/pakistans-deadly-robots-in-the-sky/article1739172/singlepage/
(discussing the increasing number of drones being fired into the tribal areas of
Pakistan).
9 Perhaps the most well-known and respected study on this data is that
collected by the New America Foundation in 2011: The Year of the Drone, supra note
1. According to its findings, non-militant fatalities comprise approximately
twenty percent of all casualties from U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan.
10 See Scott Shane, C.I.A. is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, at A1 (presenting the public debate over the CIA‘s
contention that U.S. drone strikes into Pakistan caused no civilian deaths in 2011).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/2

02 BLANK (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/14/2012 5:40 PM

AFTER TOP GUN

677

counterinsurgency strategy, and the parameters of self-defense
against terrorists. However, the debate puts a laser focus on the
impact of drone strikes on interpretations of the law of armed
conflict. These issues range from potential new—and possibly
problematic—understandings of key principles to questions
regarding the geographical parameters of the battlefield and the
impact of non-military personnel engaging in drone strikes.
Drones, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned aerial
combat vehicles, remotely piloted weapons—a long list of names
currently describes the enormous range of aerial vehicles that do
not carry a human operator. The U.S. Department of Defense
defines an unmanned aerial vehicle as:
[a] powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human
operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift,
can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be
expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or
nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise
missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered
unmanned aerial vehicles.11
It is important to note, however, that drones are not truly
―unmanned,‖ but rather remotely piloted. In fact, experts have
noted that the operation of drones involves more people than F-16s
or other fighter planes piloted in-person.12 For example, beyond
the pilot and the sensor operator, who operate the vehicle from a
remote location, recoverable drones also involve launch and
recovery teams, numerous intelligence analysts, and other legal
and operational decision-makers.13 Many therefore favor the term
―remotely piloted aircraft,‖ but since ―drone‖ is one of the most
commonly used terms, this Article will continue to use it as well.
11 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1–02, DEPARTMENT OF
OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 571 (2009).

DEFENSE DICTIONARY

12 See, e.g., Charles Blanchard, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Air Force, Remarks made at
New America Foundation conference: Drones, Remote Targeting and the Promise
of Law, Panel II (Feb. 24, 2011), available at http://www.ustream.tv
/recorded/12909598 (describing the drone targeting and acquisition process).
13 See Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, Yemen Strike Reflects U.S. Shift to Drones as
Cheaper Tool of War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at 1, 14 (stating that ―[b]ehind each
aircraft is a team of 150 or more personnel, repairing and maintaining the plane
and the heap of ground technology that keeps it in the air, poring over the hours
of videos and radio signals it collects, and gathering the voluminous intelligence
necessary to prompt a single strike‖).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012

02 BLANK (DO NOT DELETE)

678

3/14/2012 5:40 PM

U. Pa. J. Int‟l L.

[Vol. 33:3

During the past decade, the number and variety of drones have
increased dramatically.
―Within the current United States
inventory, [drones] range in size from the Wasp and the Raven, at
38 inches long, both of which are ‗launched‘ by being thrown in the
air by hand, to the twenty-seven foot long Predator and the fortyfoot long Global Hawk.‖14 The most commonly-used drones in the
U.S. arsenal are the MQ-9 Reaper and the MQ-1B Predator, both of
which are designed for persistent intelligence, reconnaissance, and
surveillance, as well as target acquisition and ―destroy and
disable‖ capabilities.15 Both systems are armed with Hellfire
missiles.16 Another example is the tiny helicopter drone Libyan
rebels used to coordinate attacks.17 At present, the United States
and Israel are the only countries using armed drones, although
Canada recently announced that it planned to acquire and use
armed drones in the near future.18 More than forty countries—and
some non-state actors—possess and employ unarmed drones,
including Russia, India, Pakistan, China, and Iran.19
The U.S. drone program has sparked extensive and intense
public commentary—academic, policy-oriented, and media—
regarding targeted killing of terrorist operatives using armed
drones. However, such attacks comprise only a small portion of
14 See Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and
the Law of Armed Conflict, 85 N.D. L. REV. 649, 653 (2009) (citing P.W. Singer,
Military Robots and the Laws of War, NEW ATLANTIS, Winter 2009, at 25, 37–39)
(explaining the variety of U.S. drone systems).
15 MQ-9 Reaper Factsheet, WWW.AF.MIL, Jan. 5, 2012, http://www.af.mil
/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405;
MQ-1B Predator
Factsheet,
WWW.AF.MIL, Jan. 5, 2012, http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets
/factsheet.asp?id=122.
16 MQ-9 Reaper Factsheet, supra note 15; MQ-1B Predator Factsheet, supra note
15.
17 See Ian Austen, Libyan Rebels Reportedly Used Tiny Canadian Surveillance
Drone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, at A11 (reporting on the sale of a commercial
Canadian drone to Libyan rebels).
18 See Canada to Acquire Attack Drones: Air Chief, CBC NEWS, Mar. 6, 2009,
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/03/06/cdn-drones.html (quoting senior
Canadian military official Lt. Gen. Angus Watt‘s saying, ―Armed unmanned
aerial vehicles [UAVs] with air to ground weapons are a valuable capability and . .
. a good option for Canadians to have‖); see also Joel Greenberg, Gaza Cease-Fire
Tested by Israeli Airstrike, Palestinian Rocket Fire, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2011
(discussing Israel‘s use of armed drones to attack militants).
19 See Jenks, supra note 14, at 654 (noting UAV capabilities of various
countries and non-state actors, including Hezbollah, which used drones along the
Israel-Lebanon border during the 2006 Lebanon War).
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the various ways in which drones are or can be used. Drones are
used extensively for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR), including identification of targets, and to support troops on
the ground.20 In the past several years, there has been extensive
academic and policy debate regarding the lawfulness of UAV
strikes and other targeted killings of al Qaeda and other operatives.
A host of interesting questions arise from this use of drones,
including the use of force in self-defense against non-state actors,
the use of force across state boundaries, the nature and content of
state consent to such operations, and the use of targeted killing as a
lawful and effective counterterrorism measure.21 These issues do
not stem from the particular weapon or weapons system; instead
they flow naturally from the jus ad bellum, the law governing the
resort to force as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.22 Thus,
although in some situations the nature of drones might enable a
broader range of options for the use of force,23 the issues raised
above are generally not drone-specific. Rather, they address
20 See Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks Under the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in
Bello: Clearing the „Fog of Law,‟ 13 Y.B. INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 311, 311–26 (2010)
(illustrating the exponential increase in drone use and how drones are used
against Taliban operations and militants); Henry Kenyon, Army Deploys More
Small
Drones
in
ISR
Surge,
DEF.
SYS.,
June
24,
2011,
http://defensesystems.com/articles/2011/06/24/army-briefing-uasplatforms.aspx (―The Army is getting ready to deploy additional numbers of
unmanned aircraft systems in Southwest Asia. Ranging from large, long-duration
platforms to small, hand-launched tactical platforms, these new systems will
support warfighters . . . .‖).
21 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and
Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT‘L L. & POL‘Y 237, 280
(2010) (analyzing the acceptability of using drones in self-defense); Kenneth
Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law (Brookings
Inst., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., & Hoover Inst. Series on Counterterrorism and
Am. Statutory Law, Working Paper No. 9, 2009) available at
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0511_counterterrorism_anderson.aspx
(explaining President Obama‘s authorization of the use of drones). See also
Schmitt, supra note 20, at 313–15 (analyzing the use of drone strikes under jus ad
bellum and jus in bello).
22 The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force, art. 2(4), with two
exceptions: the right to self-defence, art. 51, and the multilateral use of force
authorized by the Security Council under art. 43. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; U.N.
Charter art. 51; U.N. Charter art. 43.
23 See Mary Ellen O‘Connell, Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal
Operations, J.L. INFO. & SCI. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that drones have made the
use of force more likely due to the reduced domestic political consequences from
their use, as opposed to the use of manned airborne weapons platforms).
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complex contemporary challenges posed by transnational
terrorism and the proliferation of conflict between states and nonstate actors.
This Article focuses on contemporary jus in bello (law of war)
questions posed by the use of drones and will analyze drones as a
weapons system within the law of armed conflict, leaving the jus ad
bellum questions aside. Questions regarding the use of drones for
targeted killings of terrorist operatives outside of armed conflict—
or for any other purpose outside of armed conflict—raise
interesting and challenging legal issues, but remain outside the
scope of this Article.
The first Section will address foundational questions regarding
the application of the law of armed conflict to drones, including the
legality of armed drones as a weapons system and their use in
accordance with the key law of armed conflict requirements of
distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Although
many argue that the ―joystick mentality‖24 of remotely piloted
aircraft and weapons can lead to desensitization and a decreased
likelihood of adherence to international norms,25 the examination
below demonstrates that drones indeed offer extensive and
enhanced opportunities for compliance with the law of armed
conflict.
In the second Section, this Article will explore how the
burgeoning use of armed drones raises new questions for some
traditional concepts and categories within the law of armed
conflict, such as the status of persons and the geographical locus of
attacks and hostilities, and potentially new challenges in the
implementation of distinction and proportionality.
Drones‘
―capacity for persistent surveillance [has] given unprecedented
intelligence capabilities to U.S. and allied military forces in Iraq

24 See Dennis Kucinich, Drones Direct Hit Upon Rule of Law, HUFFINGTON POST
Aug. 17, 2011, 11:27 AM, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-denniskucinich/drones-direct-hit-upon-ru_b_929203.html (―[W]e have slipped into [a]
spooky new world where joystick gods manipulating robots deal death from the
skies and then go home and hug their children.‖).
25 See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Study on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, ¶ 84, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston
Report] (suggesting that drone operators could potentially be inclined to
disregard combat norms because they control the weapons far from the actual
battlefield, described as the ―Playstation mentality‖).
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and Afghanistan, [often] . . . . reshaping the capability of military
commanders and their advisers to comply with law-of-war
obligations . . . .‖26 Notwithstanding significant hue and cry
regarding their use during the past several years, the use of armed
drones offers the potential for improved law of armed conflict
compliance and protection of civilians during armed conflict.
1.

DRONES AND LOAC: A FOUNDATIONAL ANALYSIS

The law of armed conflict (LOAC), otherwise known as
international humanitarian law or the law of war, applies to
situations of armed conflict and governs the conduct of hostilities
and the protection of persons during conflict.27 At its foundation,
LOAC is based on four key principles, which undergird the spirit
and purpose of the law and drive determinations in areas such as
targeting, detention, and treatment of persons. The principle of
distinction mandates that all parties to a conflict distinguish
between those who are fighting and those who are not, and direct
attacks only at the former.28 The principle of proportionality seeks
to minimize incidental casualties during war and operationalizes
26

(2009).

Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT‘L L. 409, 417

27 See War and International Humanitarian Law, INT‘L COMM. RED CROSS,
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (explaining
that international rules are in place to ―limit the effects of armed conflict for
humanitarian reasons‖). The law of armed conflict is set forth primarily in the
four Geneva Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their Additional Protocols. See
generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter AP II]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
28 See AP I, supra note 27, art. 48 (―Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.‖).
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LOAC‘s fundamental premise that the means and methods of
attacking the enemy are not unlimited.29 Thus, a commander must
refrain from any attack in which the expected civilian casualties
will be excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage
gained.30 The principle of military necessity recognizes that a
military has the right to use any measures not forbidden by the
laws of war that are ―indispensible for securing the complete
submission of the enemy as soon as possible.‖31 Finally, the fourth
principle is the principle of humanity, also commonly referred to
as the principle of unnecessary suffering, and aims to minimize
suffering in armed conflict.32 Once a military purpose has been
achieved, the infliction of further suffering is unnecessary. In

29 See id. art. 35(1) (establishing the principle that parties to a conflict may not
use any ―methods or means of warfare‖ whatsoever).
30 See id. art. 51(5)(b) (defining any ―attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated‖ as an indiscriminate attack and therefore
prohibited).
31 DEP‘T OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE
LAW OF LAND WARFARE 4 (1956). The Lieber Code provides the earliest
codification of military necessity: Article 14 states ―those measures which are
indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to
the modern law and usages of war;‖ and Article 16 states:

[M]ilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not
admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a
district.
FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD (Gov‘t Printing Office 1898) (1863) [hereinafter LIEBER CODE],
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument.
32 The Martens Clause is the clearest statement of the principle of humanity,
found in the preamble to the Hague Convention of 1899:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain
under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as
they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from
the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
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addition, weapons that by their nature cause unnecessary suffering
are outlawed.33
1.1. Drones are Lawful Weapons
As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Arbitrary or Summary Executions stated in his recent report on
targeted killings, ―a missile fired from a drone is no different from
any other commonly used weapon, including a gun fired by a
soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires missiles. The critical
legal question is the same for each weapon: whether its specific
use complies with IHL.‖34 The first question, addressed in this
Section, is whether a particular weapon is prohibited due to its
inherent characteristics. Section 2 below will examine whether
armed drones are used in accordance with international law
principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions.
International law prohibits two categories of weapons in armed
conflict:
indiscriminate weapons and weapons that cause
unnecessary suffering. The first prohibition appears in Article
51(4) of Additional Protocol I, which defines indiscriminate attacks
as (1) attacks ―not directed at a specific military objective,‖ (2)
attacks ―which employ a method or means of combat which cannot
be directed at a military objective,‖ or (3) attacks ―which employ a
method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited
as required by this Protocol.‖35 Means of combat generally refers
to weapons or weapons systems. Thus, as the International Court
of Justice declared in its advisory opinion in the Legality of the
33 See AP I, note 27, art. 35(2) (prohibiting the use of weapons and methods of
warfare that cause ―superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering‖).
34 Alston Report, supra note 25, ¶ 79.
35 AP I, supra note 27, art. 51(4)(a)–(c). In addition, Article 35 of Additional
Protocol I sets forth the following basic rules:
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the
conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not
unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.
Id. art. 35(1)–(3).
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Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, parties to a conflict may not ―use
weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and
military targets.‖36 There is little doubt that any weapon can be
used in an indiscriminate way during conflict, such as spraying
machine gun fire into a crowd with no regard for the presence of
civilians or others who are hors de combat. Such illegal use does not
make the machine gun an unlawful weapon, however. One
example of inherently indiscriminate weapons is the rockets that
Hamas and Hezbollah have fired into Israel for many years.37
The ban on indiscriminate weapons focuses on those weapons
that are, by design or other shortcoming, ―incapable of being
targeted at a military objective only, even if collateral harm
occurs.‖38 The ban on indiscriminate effects encompasses both
these types of indiscriminate weapons and the use of otherwise
lawful weapons in an indiscriminate manner. For example, the use
of cluster munitions is highly disputed for this reason.39 As the
International Committee of the Red Cross has stated,
―[t]hese characteristics [of cluster munitions] raise serious
questions as to whether such weapons can be used in
populated areas in accordance with the rule of distinction
and the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. The wide
area effects of these weapons and the large number of
unguided submunitions released would appear to make it

36 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 257 [¶ 78] (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
37 See, e.g., Gaza/Israel: Hamas Rocket Attacks on Civilians Unlawful, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/06/gazaisraelhamas-rocket-attacks-civilians-unlawful (noting that the rockets Hamas has fired
on Israel are indiscriminate because ―they cannot be aimed with any reliability‖).
38 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 588–89 [¶
24] (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins). Examples could include
missiles with a faulty guidance system resulting in an inability to aim only at
military objectives or biological weapons that can spread contagion among the
civilian population when not checked by an antidote. Michael N. Schmitt, Future
War and the Principle of Discrimination, 28 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 51, 55 (1998).
39 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement, ¶ 463 (Int‘l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007) (holding that ―the M-87
Orkan, by virtue of its characteristics and the firing range in this specific instance,
was incapable of hitting specific targets . . . . [thereby rendering it] an
indiscriminate weapon, the use of which in densely populated civilian areas, such
as Zagreb, will result in the infliction of severe casualties.‖).
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difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between military
objectives and civilians in a populated target area.‖40
Others argue that cluster munitions may well be a more
discriminating weapon in certain circumstances because if they
were banned, many more missions would be needed to achieve the
same effect and cover the same amount of area. By increasing the
number of missions, the attacking force consequently would
expose more of its force and more civilians to a heightened risk.41
Further, cluster munitions could reduce collateral damage because
of their small detonating impact; otherwise, forces would have to
use a more highly explosive weapon to accomplish the same
military goal, thereby creating more damage.42
Second, weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or
superfluous injury are prohibited. The goal is to minimize harm
that is not justified by military utility, either because of a lack of
any utility at all or because the utility gained is considerably
outweighed by the suffering caused.43
The international
community‘s first effort at regulating weapons was the St.
Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight of December 11,
1868, which sought to outlaw ―the employment of arms which
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their
death inevitable.‖44 Repeated in Article 23(e) of the Annex to the
40 Int‘l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Observations on the Legal Issues
Related to the Use of Cluster Munitions, ¶ 8, Grp. of Gov‘t Experts of High
Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, U.N.
Doc. CCW/GGE/2007/WP.8 (June 25, 2007).
41 See Nout van Woudenberg, The Long and Winding Road Towards an
Instrument on Cluster Munitions, 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 447, 450 (2007) (―[W]here
use is made of an alternative to cluster weapons, more missions are needed in
order to cover the same area.‖); see also Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block:
Cluster Munitions and the Law of War, 51 A.F.L. REV. 229, 258–59 (2001) (noting that
cluster munitions may be deployed lawfully in certain circumstances).
42 See van Woudenberg, supra note 41, at 450 (explaining that, in particular
situations, cluster weapons can pose less danger to civilian populations than
weapons that have larger explosive charges).
43 See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 401 [¶ 1414], (Claude Pilloud et al.
eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOL COMMENTARY] (―The principle is that of the
prohibition of weapons which would unnecessarily increase the suffering of men
rendered hors de combat, or which would inevitably lead to their death.‖).
44 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight pmbl., Nov. 29–Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in 1
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1907 Hague Convention IV, this prohibition is recognized as
customary international law.45 The International Court of Justice
emphasized this norm as the second of two cardinal principles of
international law, explaining that
it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to
combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons
causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their
suffering. In application of that second principle, States do
not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the
weapons they use.46
The basic idea behind the prohibition on weapons that cause
unnecessary suffering is that weapons that increase suffering—
specifically that of combatants—without increasing military
advantage in any way are unlawful. Expanding bullets and
blinding lasers offer two examples. Certainly many weapons cause
extensive—even horrible—suffering and injury, but that in and of
itself is not the key issue. The analysis hinges on two primary
factors: ―(a) whether an alternative weapon is available, causing
less injury or suffering; and . . . (b) whether the effects produced by
the alternative weapon are sufficiently effective in neutralizing
enemy personnel.‖47
By both measures — indiscriminate weapon or effects and
unnecessary suffering—armed drones pass muster. Armed drones
fire Hellfire missiles and other similar munitions, all of which are
also carried by or are similar to the weapons carried by piloted

SUPPLEMENT AM. J. INT‘L L. 95 (1907) [hereinafter The Declaration of St. Petersburg,
1868].
45 See Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(e), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277
[hereinafter Hague Convention No. IV] (―In addition to the prohibitions provided
by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden . . . (e) To employ arms,
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering‖); see also W.
Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 Y.B. INT‘L
HUMANITARIAN L. 55, 120 (2005) (asserting that, of the many provisions dealing
with the use of conventional weapons, Article 23(e) of the Hague Convention IV is
perhaps the only one that is clearly respected as ―customary international law‖).
46 See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 36, at 275 [¶ 78].
47 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 60 (2004) (citing NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS, COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1997 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 196 (Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1982).
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fighter aircraft.48
These missiles are not banned by any
international agreement and do not manifest any characteristics
that cause superfluous injury as understood in international law.
In fact, the precision-guided munitions that drones carry and their
extensive surveillance capabilities make them particularly
discriminate weapons. The ability to track a target for hours, even
days, before launching an attack facilitates accurate targeting and
enhances the protection of civilians by giving drone operators the
ability to choose the time and place of attack with an eye towards
minimizing civilian casualties or damage. Therefore, armed
drones can easily be aimed at only military objectives and have
effects that can be limited, as much as possible, to military objects,
thus meeting the standards in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol
I.49
The fact that armed drones could be used—and perhaps have
been used—in indiscriminate attacks does not make them an
inherently unlawful weapon or weapons system. Determinations
of legality, such as those required in new weapons reviews under
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I,50 do not mean that states must
anticipate any possible unlawful use of a weapon. Rather, as noted
at the 1974–1977 Diplomatic Conference that produced the
Additional Protocols, the question is ―whether the employment of
a weapon for its normal or expected use would be prohibited
under some or all circumstances. A State is not required to foresee
or analyze all possible misuses of a weapon, for almost any
weapon can be misused in ways that would be prohibited.‖51 The
normal or expected use of armed drones falls clearly within the
parameters of lawful weapons under international law.

48 See, e.g., MQ-1B Predator Fact Sheet, supra note 15 (noting that the MQ-1B
remotely piloted drone carries AGM-114 Hellfire missiles); MQ-9 Reaper Factsheet,
supra note 15 (noting that the MQ-9 remotely piloted drone carries Hellfire
missiles).
49 For an articulation of Article 51(4)‘s required elements, see supra Section
1.1, note 35 and accompanying text.
50 See AP I, supra note 27, art. 36 (―In the study, development, acquisition or
adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting
Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some
or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of
international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.‖).
51 See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 43, at 424 [¶ 1469].
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1.2. Lawful Use of Drones
Upon a determination that armed drones are lawful weapons,
the next step is to examine how they are being used and whether
such use complies with, and perhaps even enhances, the
implementation of LOAC. As noted above, a lawful weapon can
be used unlawfully in certain circumstances, such as in deliberate
attacks on civilians or in indiscriminate attacks. In order to comply
with LOAC, parties launching attacks must abide by the principle
of distinction, the principle of proportionality and the obligation of
precautions in attack. Access to reliable factual information about
the United States UAV strikes in Afghanistan, northwest Pakistan,
Yemen, or other locations, for example, is difficult to obtain in
many circumstances.52 Disputes regarding facts on the ground,
numbers of persons killed, identities of those killed, and other key
information do impact the ability to analyze compliance with
LOAC norms. However, it is reasonable, in light of existing
information, to examine the use of armed drones within the
framework of the central principles of distinction, proportionality,
and precautions.
Many critics argue that drones ―make it easier to kill without
risk to a State‘s forces, [so] policy makers and commanders will be
tempted to interpret the legal limitations on who can be killed, and
under what circumstances, too expansively.‖53 The analysis below,
however, will demonstrate that, as one international legal expert
explains:
[T]here is little reason to treat drones as distinct from other
weapons systems with regard to the legal consequences of
their employment.
Nor is there a sound basis for
heightened concern as to their use. On the contrary, the use
of drones may actually, in certain cases, enhance the
protections to which various persons and objects are
entitled under [LOAC].54
The extensive capabilities of drones urge examination not only of
whether their use complies with LOAC, but also whether they
52 See e.g., Shane, supra note 10 (noting a wide disparity between the official
American record of civilian casualties and unofficial sources).
53 Alston Report, supra note 25, ¶ 80.
54 Schmitt, supra note 20, at 313.
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offer better opportunities for adherence to the law. Drones ―now
not only perform persistent surveillance to identify and track
targets—on missions that may exceed the limited endurance and
skills of human pilots—but also constitute lethal weapons
platforms with a continuous presence, enabling attacks on more
targets in more situations than ever before.‖55 Many more
situations triggering analysis of LOAC‘s key principles therefore
arise with the use of armed drones.
1.2.1. Distinction
Identifying who or what can be targeted is one of the most
fundamental issues during conflict. In traditional conflicts, one
could distinguish between soldiers—who wore uniforms—and
civilians—who typically did not venture near the battlefield — in
most circumstances. Similarly, identifying military and civilian
objects was usually feasible. Contemporary conflicts introduce a
whole set of new challenges in this area, however, demanding
ever-greater
efforts—through
intelligence-gathering
and
surveillance—to determine who is who in the zone of combat
operations.56
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I sets forth the fundamentals
of the principle of distinction:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives.57
Distinction lies at the core of IHL‘s seminal goal of protecting
innocent civilians and persons who are hors de combat. The
obligation to distinguish forms part of the customary international
law of both international and non-international armed conflicts, as
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Beard, supra note 26, at 414.
See Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks:
Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT‘L SEC. J. 45,
45–48 (2010) (analyzing the challenges of implementing the law of war in
contemporary state versus non-state actor conflicts).
57 AP I, supra note 27, art. 48.
55
56
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(―ICTY‖) held in the Tadic case.58 As a result, all parties to any
conflict are obligated to distinguish between combatants, or
fighters, and civilians, and concomitantly, to distinguish
themselves from civilians and their own military objects from
civilian objects.
The purpose of distinction—to protect civilians—is emphasized
in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which states that ―[t]he
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not
be the object of attack.‖59 Article 51 continues, stating:
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.
Indiscriminate
attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific
military objective; (b) those which employ a method or
means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific
military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as
required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such
case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.60

58 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 111, 127 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (citing U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2675: ―Bearing
in mind the need for measures to ensure the better protection of human rights in
armed conflicts of all types . . . [the General Assembly] affirms the following basic
principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, without
prejudice to their future elaboration within the framework of progressive
development of the international law of armed conflict: . . . 2. [I]n the conduct of
military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be made at all times
between persons actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations‖).
See also Nuclear Weapons, supra note 36, at 257 [¶ 79] (―[T]hese fundamental rules
are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions
that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of
international customary law.‖); JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME 1: RULES, at rules 3–11,
25–32, 34–76 (2005) [hereinafter CIHL] (referencing rules based on the principle of
distinction that have become part of customary international law); Abella v.
Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev., ¶ 177 (1998) (noting that the obligation to
distinguish between combatants and civilians is customary international law).
59 AP I, supra note 27, art. 51(2).
60 Id. art. 51(4).
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Furthermore, Article 85 of Protocol I declares that nearly all
violations of distinction constitute grave breaches of the Protocol,61
and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court similarly
criminalizes attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks.62
Upon examination, several features of drones and aspects of
how armed drones are used demonstrate a substantial, even
heightened ability to conform to distinction‘s obligations. It is
important to note, again, that armed drones, like any other weapon
or weapon system, can be used to engage in deliberate or
indiscriminate attacks against civilians or other protected
individuals during armed conflict. The first aspect of distinction in
which drones offer extensive capabilities is in the identification of
targets. A lawful attack must be directed at a legitimate target:
either a combatant or a civilian directly participating in hostilities.
In international armed conflicts—those occurring between states—
all members of the state‘s regular armed forces are combatants and
can be identified by the uniform they wear, among other

61 Id. art. 85(3) (―[T]he following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of
this Protocol, when committed wilfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of
this Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or health: (a) making the
civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack; (b) launching an
indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the
knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii) . . . .‖).
62 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(i–ii) &
(iv–vi), 8(2)(e)(i–ii & iv), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter
Rome Statute] (―For the purpose of this Statute, ‗war crimes‘ means: . . .
[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; [i]ntentionally directing
attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives; . . .
[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated; [a]ttacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns,
villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military
objectives; [k]illing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or
having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; . . .
[i]ntentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions in conformity with international law; . . . [i]ntentionally directing
attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded
are collected, provided they are not military objectives . . . .‖).
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characteristics.63 In state versus non-state actor conflicts, including
counterterrorism operations within the context of an armed
conflict, determining who is a legitimate target is significantly
more complex. The legal obligation remains the same, however,
requiring parties ―to distinguish between an innocent civilian and
an individual who, although dressed in civilian attire, may pose an
immediate threat and is therefore a legitimate target.‖64 In
addition, a commander must assess whether and when to target
manifestly hostile persons deliberately hiding among the civilian
population.
Persons who are members of an organized armed group are
legitimate targets at all times65—but dress the same as civilians
either for a lack of uniforms or specifically to blend into the civilian
population for protection. In such cases, the surveillance capability
of drones plays an essential role in differentiating such persons
from innocent civilians. A second category of legitimate target, as
noted above, is the civilian directly participating in hostilities. The
concept of what constitutes direct participation has been the
subject of extensive analysis and debate and is outside the scope of
this Article.66 Nonetheless, regardless of the particular parameters
63 See GC III, supra note 27, at art. 4(A) (providing that all members of the
regular armed forces of a State party to an international armed conflict are entitled
to prisoner of war status and thus considered combatants).
64 Blank & Guiora, supra note 56, at 58.
65 See Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT‘L REV. RED CROSS 991, 995
(2008) (adopted by ICRC Assembly Feb. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.cicr.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf
[hereinafter Interpretive Guidance] (stating that organized armed groups are
targetable based on status in non-international armed conflict). See also JIMMY
GURULÉ & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 70–76 (2011)
(discussing the rules governing targeting of enemy forces in international and
non-international armed conflict and noting ―a member of an enemy force . . . is
presumed hostile and therefore presumptively subject to attack‖ in international
armed conflict, and ―[s]ubjecting members of organized belligerent groups to
status based targeting pursuant to the LOAC as opposed to civilians who
periodically lose their protection from attack seems both logical and consistent
with the practice of states engaged in non-international armed conflicts‖).
66 See generally Melzer, supra note 65; Forum, Direct Participation in Hostilities:
Perspectives on the ICRC Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 637 (2010).
See also HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov‘t of Israel, 57(6)
IsrSC 285, ¶¶ 34–37 [2006] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il
/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf [hereinafter Targeted Killings Case]
(analyzing the meaning of direct participation in hostilities for the purpose of
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of direct participation, the essence of the targeting determination in
this situation is that persons directly participating in hostilities—
whether all the time or only once or intermittently—must be
distinguished from innocent civilians.67 As in the case of members
of organized groups who appear to be civilians, intelligence
information and extensive surveillance will be the key to accurate
and discriminatory targeting of such persons—and thus the key to
protection of innocent civilians from the consequences of combat
operations. When neither hostile persons nor members of armed
groups wear uniforms or carry their arms openly, the intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of drones offer great
benefits for the implementation of the obligation of distinction.
Drone attacks rely on high resolution imagery usually
transmitted in real time to a drone crew which,
undistracted by any threat, engages the target. When
feasible and necessary, drones can be used to carefully
monitor the potential target for extended periods before
engaging it with precision weapons. Compared to attacks
by manned aircraft or ground-based systems, the result is
often a significantly reduced risk of misidentifying the
target [or attacking the wrong target].68
Using drones, commanders can track and analyze the daily
activities of suspected militants, helping to ensure that civilians are
not mistakenly targeted. For such planned targets, the ―pattern of
life analysis‖69—an assessment of who lives and works in a
particular structure or area—is a linchpin of distinction.
―Unmanned systems [therefore] seem to offer several ways of
determining the legality of Israel‘s policy of targeted killings, and concluding that
the legality of such strikes must be determined on a case-by-case basis).
67 See Targeted Killings Case, 57(6) IsrSC 285, ¶¶ 31–33 & 40, available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf
(highlighting the importance of the direct participation analysis for the effective
implementation of the principle of distinction).
68 Schmitt, supra note 20, at 320.
69 For example, until at least August 2010 in Afghanistan, the International
Security Assistance Force rules of engagement mandated a forty-eight-hour
pattern of life assessment before any target could be approved. See Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, Petraeus Reviews Directive Meant to Limit Afghan Civilian Deaths,
WASH. POST, July 9, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/08/AR2010070806219.html (describing General
Petraeus‘s intention to review the tactical directive giving rise to the 48-hour rule).
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reducing the mistakes and unintended costs of war,‖ such as using
―far better sensors and processing power,‖ ―allow[ing] decisions to
be made in a more deliberate manner‖ and ―remov[ing] the anger
and emotion from the humans behind them.‖70
1.2.2. Proportionality
Once a legitimate target is identified, the legal analysis does not
end. Rather, the attacking party must then assess whether the
attack satisfies the principle of proportionality.71 LOAC flatly
prohibits any intentional targeting of civilians, but armed conflict
involves an infinite array of circumstances in which civilians may
die or suffer grievous injury as a result of attacks launched directly
at military targets and combatants. Technical malfunctions,
inclement weather, faulty intelligence and navigation errors can all
also cause a bomb to fall short and cause significant unanticipated
civilian casualties.
Beyond errors and accidents, on many
occasions, a commander can anticipate that some civilians will
suffer harm: there may be civilians near the person being targeted
or in a building or location identified as a legitimate target. The
commander planning the attack may have a range of choices in
terms of tactics and weapons in attacking the target, which could
result in different consequences for civilians in the area; in some
situations, there may only be one option.
LOAC seeks to minimize such incidental civilian casualties as
well, such that proportionality effectively operationalizes LOAC‘s
fundamental premise that the means and methods of attacking the
enemy are not unlimited. Article 35 of Additional Protocol I
70 P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, NEW ATLANTIS, Winter
2009, at 25, 40–41, available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib
/20090203_TNA23Singer.pdf. See also Anna Mulrine, A Look Inside the Air Force‟s
Control Center for Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 29, 2008,
available at http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/05/29/a-lookinside-the-air-forces-control-center-for-iraq-and-afghanistan
(explaining
that
Drones enable commanders to ―establish a ‗pattern of life‘ around potential
targets—recording such things as the comings and goings of friends, school hours,
and market times. Despite the distance, the real-time video feeds often give them
a better vantage point than an Army unit has just down the street from a group of
insurgents.‖).
71 See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 38, at 587 [¶ 20] (dissenting opinion of
Judge Higgins) (―[E]ven a legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral
civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from the
attack.‖).
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declares that ―[i]n any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the
conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited,‖ a
basic principle that dates back at least to the 1907 Hague
Convention.72 Importantly, however, the law does not prohibit all
civilian deaths—and in fact accepts some incidental civilian
casualties.73 At the same time, it does mandate that the only
legitimate object of war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy.74 In this way, proportionality balances military necessity
and humanity. To protect innocent civilians from the effects of war
and minimize undue suffering, LOAC prohibits disproportionate
attacks. Therefore, commanders must refrain from attacks where
the expected loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property
from an attack will be excessive in relation to the anticipated
military advantage gained from the attack.75
Collateral damage, a term seen regularly in news reports
regarding drone strikes and targeted killing, refers to civilians
killed in the course of attacks on military objectives—that is, the
incidental casualties from an attack. Given the focus of this Article
on the lawfulness of armed drones within the law of armed
conflict, it is crucial to understand a fundamental distinction
between LOAC and human rights or domestic criminal law. Both
legal regimes forbid the deliberate killing of innocent civilians.76
72 AP I, supra note 27, art. 35. See Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 45,
art. 22 (―The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited.‖).
73 See Judith Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus in
Bello, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 283–84 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999)
(―The immunity of non-combatants from the effects of warfare . . . has never been
regarded as absolute. The incidence of some civilian casualties has always been
tolerated as a consequence of military action.‖).
74 See The Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, supra note 44, pmbl. (―[T]he
only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is
to weaken the military force of the enemy . . . .‖).
75 See AP I, supra note 27, art. 51(5) (―Among others, the following types of
attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: . . . [a]n attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.‖). The same language
appears in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, which refers specifically to
precautions in attack. Id. art. 57(2)(b).
76 See AP I, supra note 27, art. 51(2) (―The civilian population . . . shall not be
the object of attack.‖); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (stating that every human being shall have an
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LOAC, however, anticipates and accepts that parties may
knowingly kill civilians without violating the law. Thus, a party
attacking a military objective may know for certain that some
number of civilians—perhaps janitorial staff working in the
building—will die when the building is hit. Such knowledge does
not mean the party has committed a crime; rather, LOAC allows
for such incidental civilian casualties to the extent that they are not
excessive in relation to the military advantage gained from the
attack.77 The crux of the issue, therefore, is how to interpret
―excessive‖ in relation to military advantage and from which
perspective.78 As the very language of Additional Protocol I
shows, referring to ―anticipated‖ military advantage and
―expected‖ civilian casualties, proportionality must be viewed
prospectively, not in hindsight. Instead, the information available
and the circumstances at the time of the military operation in
question must govern how we approach the balance between
military advantage and civilian casualties. Because combat, even a
minor firefight, involves confusion and uncertainty—the ―fog of
war‖—these ―decisions cannot be judged on the basis of
―inherent right to life‖); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (―Everyone‘s right to
life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime
for which this penalty is provided by law.‖).
77 See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990)
(―Within both the Just War Tradition and the law of war, it has always been
permissible to attack combatants even though some noncombatants may be
injured or killed; so long as injury to noncombatants is ancillary (indirect and
unintentional) to the attack of an otherwise lawful target, the principle of
noncombatant immunity is met.‖).
78 See Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 293 (Susan C. Breau &
Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006) (―Focusing on excessiveness avoids the legal
fiction that collateral damage, incidental injury, and military advantage can be
precisely measured.‖); Joseph Holland, Military Objective and Collateral Damage:
Their Relationship and Dynamics, 7 Y.B. INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 35, 47 (2004)
(―Clearly, one cannot always attribute every civilian death after an attack to the
attacker. . . . One cannot assess incidental civilian losses for which the attacker is
responsible by simply conducting a body count. Such an oversimplification is as
superficial as assessing the quality of a hospital by only counting the bodies in its
morgue.‖); William J. Fenrick, The Prosecution of Unlawful Attack Cases Before the
ICTY, 7 Y.B. INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 153, 175 (2004) (―The actual results of the
attack may assist in inferring the intent of the attacker as he or she launched the
attack but what counts is what was in the mind of the decision maker when the
attack was launched.‖).
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information which has subsequently come to light.‖79
The
proportionality of any attack—and thus both the anticipated
military advantage and the expected civilian casualties—must
thus be viewed from the perspective of the military commander on
the ground, taking into account the information he or she had at
the time.
Just as with distinction, proportionality mandates that parties
to a conflict gather and assess information about the target, the
target area, and those persons and objects in the vicinity of the
target. In the context of proportionality, drones appear to be
particularly well designed for adherence to these obligations. The
heart of this comprehensive surveillance and intelligence-gathering
process is the ―pattern of life‖ analysis. Using drones, which can
loiter over a target and the surrounding area for days, commanders
can follow a target and gather information about the civilian
population in the area and the potential for civilian casualties in
possible strike locations and at certain times.
Because the drones provide high quality information about
the target area in real-time (or near real-time), for extended
periods and without risk to the operators, they [thus]
permit more refined assessments of the likely collateral
damage to civilians and civilian objects. The ability of
armed drones to observe the target area for long periods
before attacking means the operators are better able to
verify the nature of a proposed target and strike only when
the opportunity to minimize collateral damage is at its
height.80
At a preliminary level, therefore, the capacity that armed
drones offer for pre-attack surveillance and at-the-moment
awareness of the target and civilians in the area offers great
79 Canada, Reservations and Statements of Understanding made upon
Ratification of Additional Protocol I, 20 Nov. 1990, § 7, available at
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_ca_rule14.
See also,
Belgium, Interpretative Declarations Made Upon Ratification of Additional
Protocol I, 20 May 1986, § 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_be_rule15_SectionD (―[T]he only information on which
[proportionality determinations] can possibly be taken is such relevant
information as is then available and that it has been feasible from him to obtain
for that purpose.‖).
80 Schmitt, supra note 20, at 314.
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opportunities for compliance with LOAC‘s proportionality
obligations. There is little doubt that better information about
where and when civilians are present can help to minimize civilian
casualties from strikes on military targets.
1.2.3. Precautions in Attack
LOAC mandates that all parties take certain precautionary
measures to protect civilians. In many ways, the identification of
military objectives and the proportionality considerations are, of
course, precautions. But the obligations of the parties to a conflict
to take precautionary measures go beyond that. Beginning at the
broadest level, Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I states: ―In the
conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.‖81 This
provision is a direct outgrowth of, and supplement to, the Basic
Rule in Article 48, which mandates that all parties distinguish
between combatants and civilians, and between military objects
and civilian objects. The practical provisions forming the major
portion of Article 57 discuss precautions to be taken specifically
when launching an attack. Precautions are, understandably, a
critical component of the law‘s efforts to protect civilians and are of
particular importance in densely populated areas or areas where
civilians are at risk from the consequences of military operations.82
For this reason, even if a target is legitimate under the laws of war,
failure to take precautions can make an attack on that target
unlawful.
First, parties must do everything feasible to ensure that targets
are military objectives.83 Doing so helps to protect civilians by
limiting attacks to military targets, thus directly implementing the
principle of distinction. Second, they must choose the means and
methods of attack with the aim of minimizing incidental civilian
losses and damage.84 For example, during the 1991 Persian Gulf
War, ―pilots were advised to attack bridges in urban areas along a
longitudinal axis. This measure was taken so that bombs that
AP I, supra note 27, art. 57(1).
See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 43, at 679 [¶ 2190](―It is clear that
the precautions prescribed here will be of greatest importance in urban areas
because such areas are most densely populated.‖).
83 AP I, supra note 27, art. 57(2)(a)(i).
84 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
81
82
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missed their targets—because they were dropped either too early
or too late—would hopefully fall in the river and not on civilian
housing.‖85 Another common method of taking precautions is to
launch attacks on particular targets at night when the civilian
population is not on the streets or at work, thus minimizing
potential losses. In addition, when choosing between two possible
attacks offering similar military advantage, parties must choose the
objective that offers the least likely harm to civilians and civilian
objects.86 Each of these steps requires an attacking party to take
affirmative action to preserve civilian immunity and minimize
civilian casualties and damage—in effect, to take ―constant care.‖
Proportionality considerations are also a major component of the
precautions framework. Parties are required to refrain from any
attacks that would be disproportionate and to cancel any attacks
when it becomes evident that the civilian losses would be excessive
in light of the military advantage.87 Finally, Article 57(2)(c) of
Additional Protocol I requires attacking parties to issue an effective
advance warning ―of attacks which may affect the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not permit.‖88
At the same time, it is important to note that, as in other areas,
LOAC is at its foundation concerned with practicalities. The
obligation is to take precautions that are feasible in the
circumstances, given the information available to the commanders
and military planners. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
explained that, ―[b]y ‗feasible,‘ Article 57 means those measures
that are practicable or practically possible, taking into account all
circumstances ruling at the time.‖89 Precautions cannot be judged
by whether a certain result was obtained after the fact;90
85 Jean-François Quéguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct
of Hostilities, 88 INT‘L REV. RED CROSS 793, 801 (2006) (noting that this angle of
attack ―also means that damage would tend to be in the middle of the bridge and
thus easier to repair‖) (citing Michael W. Lewis, The Law of Aerial Bombardment in
the 1991 Gulf War, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 481, 501 (2003)).
86 AP I, supra note 27, art. 57(3).
87 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii) and art. 57(2)(b).
88 Id. art. 57(2)(c).
89 Ethiopia v. Eritrea, Partial Award—Western & Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia‘s
Claims 1 & 3, ¶ 33 (Eri. Eth. Claims Comm‘n, 2005), available at http://www.pcacpa.org/upload/files/FINAL%20ET%20FRONT%20CLAIMS(1).pdf.
90 Rather, the language of both provisions, speaking of attacks that ―may
affect‖ the civilian population in AP I, supra note 27, art. 57(2)(c), and accounting
for ―circumstances‖ or events within the commander‘s ―power,‖ in Hague IV,
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nonetheless, they do demand that parties gather, analyze, and act
on all relevant information in the planning process. The ability of
drones to loiter over a target and gather information greatly
increases the time during which a target can be analyzed and
verified, in most cases significantly improving the accuracy of
attacks.
Distinction and proportionality considerations do not generally
turn on the choice of an armed UAV rather than a missile fired
from a piloted aircraft. The actual choice of weapon or weapons
system, however, is a component of the obligation to take
precautions.91 Means and methods of warfare must be chosen with
an eye to minimizing or even avoiding civilian casualties.
Here a drone must be used when reasonably available and
its use is operationally feasible, but only if such use would
minimize likely collateral damage without sacrificing
military advantage. Conversely, drones may not be used
when other means or methods of warfare that would result
in less collateral damage with an equivalent prospect of
mission success are available.92
The legal issue concerns what amount of information constitutes
sufficient available information for an acceptable determination
regarding precautions and proportionality. As the ICTY stated, the
question is ―whether a reasonably well-informed person in the
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of
the information available to him or her, could have expected
excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.‖93 In an age
when the information-gathering capabilities of drones make
extraordinary amounts of information available, it is reasonable to
examine whether using drones adds any heightened standard for
the use of information in analyzing targets, potential collateral
damage and other considerations.
The new ―persistent
supra note 45, art. 26, leads to the conclusion that the law focuses on the content
and nature of the warnings at the time and whether they were reasonable and
effective under the circumstances.
91 See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 43, at 682 [¶ 2200] (noting that
although the rule itself does not imply a prohibition of specific weapons, ―their
precision and range should be taken into account . . . .‖).
92 Schmitt, supra note 20, at 325.
93 Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 58
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
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surveillance‖ capabilities of drones, including ―network-centric
access to related ISR data throughout the command structure, the
improving quality and types of information collected by virtual
platforms (especially real-time data), and the complete lack of risk
involved in the collection of information‖94 are continually
reshaping these questions.
Some therefore argue that the
obligation to take all feasible precautions extends beyond analysis
of information gathered on-scene to include ―assessment[s] of the
key methods, procedures, and systems necessary to support the
effective use of the virtual technologies to be deployed, including a
careful evaluation of whether appropriate efforts are being made to
ensure that databases are sufficiently accurate to catch mistakes by
the human operators.‖95
In all three areas—distinction, proportionality, and
precautions—drones‘ unique and advanced capabilities suggest
great potential for adherence to LOAC‘s obligations. Drones are
not automatons; they depend on human operators, analysts, and
decisionmakers.
As a result, the use of armed drones in
compliance with the law also depends on these same categories of
human participants. Some critics challenge the growing use of
armed drones, arguing that remote operators are desensitized to
the effects of combat and risk approaching targeting—and
killing—as a video game rather than a war with real life-and-death
consequences.96 In the same vein, such detractors raise concerns
that because drones ―make it easier to kill without risk to a State‘s
forces, policy makers and commanders will be tempted to interpret
the legal limitations on who can be killed, and under what
circumstances, too expansively.‖97 These concerns are certainly
legitimate, but perhaps a bit unfounded. Pilots who have flown
both fighter jets and drones explain that while the F-16 pilot

94 Beard, supra note 26, at 435, n. 139 (citing Michael N. Schmitt, Precision
Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 Int‘l Rev. Red Cross 445, 461 (2005)).
95 Id. at 441.
96 See David E. Anderson, Drones and the Ethics of War, RELIGION & ETHICS
NEWSWEEKLY (May 14, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics
/episodes/by-topic/international/drones-and-the-ethics-of-war/6290/ (citing
one critic of drone strikes who argues that ―[T}he real ethical issue . . . is ‗the
greater propensity to kill‘ made possible by the ‗video game-like‘ quality of drone
combat.‖).
97 Alston Report, supra note 25, ¶ 80.
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engages the target and then returns to the base, drones, in contrast,
are intimately connected to the battlefield, the target and the
aftermath of the attack. ―The amount of time spent surveilling an
area—sometimes hundreds of hours are devoted to a single
mission—creates a greater sense of intimacy than with other
aircraft,‖98 debunking the myth of the ―Playstation mentality.‖ As
one UAV commander explains,
―There‘s no detachment. . . . Those employing the system
are very involved at a personal level in combat. You hear
the AK-47 going off, the intensity of the voice on the radio
calling for help. You‘re looking at him, 18 inches away
from him, trying everything in your capability to get that
person out of trouble.‖99
In addition, the UAV will remain over the attack site and go
from launching an attack into a battle damage assessment
immediately thereafter.100 UAV pilots and sensor operators have
significantly greater engagement with the battlefield and the
destruction of war than other pilots. In the end, though, it is
compliance with the law that matters to ensure protection for
civilians and others under LOAC, not the moral or mental
motivation of the attacker in fulfilling the obligations of distinction,
proportionality, and precautions.
2.

THE IMPACT OF DRONES ON TRADITIONAL
LOAC CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS

The increased use of armed drones over the past decade, both
in armed conflict and in counterterrorism operations outside of
armed conflict, has also played a major role in introducing some
questions regarding the application of traditional LOAC concepts
and categories to today‘s conflicts and situations. As the media
have reported extensively, U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan are
generally planned and executed by intelligence agencies and
98 Megan McCloskey, The War Room: Daily Transition between Battle, Home
Takes a Toll on Drone Operators, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://www.stripes.com/news/the-war-room-daily-transition-between-battlehome-takes-a-toll-on-drone-operators-1.95949.
99 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
100 See Blanchard, supra note 12 (explaining in detail the U.S. Air Force‘s
process of drone targeting and acquisition).
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operatives, rather than the military.101 In some cases, contractors
play a significant role in the operation of the drones as well, often
at the launch and recovery sites overseas.102 The involvement of
non-military personnel, whether intelligence operatives or
contractors, can have consequences for the application of LOAC to
such persons during armed conflict. Another challenging issue
involves the geographical parameters of the battlefield. The ability
to use armed drones across state borders without risk to personnel
who could be shot down or captured across those borders could
have an expansive effect on the location of conflict and hostilities,
in essence broadening the battlefield beyond traditional
parameters. Finally, extensive media coverage of the psychological
and emotional impact of the UAV campaigns, particularly in
northwest Pakistan, raises questions about whether there are
second-order effects from the UAV strikes beyond the fundamental
questions of applying LOAC principles to the actual targeting and
strikes.
2.1. Status of Operators and Direct Participation
LOAC is relevant not only in analyzing the lawfulness of
particular attacks, but also in determining the rights and privileges
of persons involved in the operation and targeting of drones. In
international armed conflict, LOAC recognizes two categories:
combatants and civilians.103 This status, whether on the battlefield
or off, determines whether a person can lawfully engage in
hostilities, is immune from attack, and enjoys the privileges of
prisoner of war status upon capture, among other questions. In
non-international armed conflict, LOAC does not contemplate
combatant status and leaves classification of persons to the state‘s
101 See, e.g., Scott Shane, C.I.A. Drone Use is Set to Expand Inside Pakistan, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, at A1 (noting the C.I.A.‘s increased use of remote missiles and
aircraft to target al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their allies); Craig Whitlock & Greg
Miller, U.S. Creating a Ring of Secret Drone Bases, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2011, at A1
(describing the Obama administration‘s construction of drone bases to combat alQaeda and its allies in Somalia and Yemen).
102 See James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Said to Use Outsiders to Put Bombs
on Drones, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, at A1 (describing how the Xe company,
formerly known as Blackwater, has assumed an important role in the U.S.
military‘s anti-terrorism drone operations).
103 See GC III, supra note 27, art. 4 (defining prisoners of war); AP I, supra note
27, art. 50 (defining civilians and civilian populations).
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domestic law.104 This distinction raises two questions: who has a
legal right to launch attacks using armed drones, and what are the
consequences for those who do so in the absence of such legal
authority?
For the purposes of the instant discussion, the first key
difference between combatants and other persons during armed
conflict is that combatants are entitled to engage in hostilities—
lawful belligerents do not commit crimes when they engage in
lawful killing or destruction of property in the course of
hostilities.105 Thus, a soldier who kills the enemy in accordance
with the law of war—the person killed was a legitimate target, the
attack complied with basic LOAC principles, and so forth—is not
engaging in what would, under domestic law, be murder. In this
way, the law effectively permits acts that would be criminal during
peacetime, reflecting the fact that soldiers act as agents of the
sovereign state.106 Persons who do not qualify for combatant
status, in contrast, can be prosecuted for acts on the battlefield
under domestic law, because they do not enjoy the privilege of
combatant immunity.107
As members of the regular armed forces of a state, military
personnel who operate drones are combatants and therefore do not
pose any questions regarding the authority to use lethal force in
the course of armed conflict. U.S. drone strikes in Afghanistan, or
Israeli drone strikes against Palestinian militants108 in the course of
that armed conflict, do not raise questions regarding status and

104 See ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 259 (2008) (―[T]here is no prisoner of
war status under NIAC. The state where the non-international armed conflict
takes place can treat the rebels as simple criminals and try them for having taken
up the arms against the government, contrary to the criminal law of that state.‖).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp.2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(holding that an American who fought for the Taliban was not a lawful
combatant, and therefore was not entitled to combatant immunity under GC III).
106 See, e.g., LIEBER CODE, supra note 31, art. 57 (―So soon as a man is armed by
a sovereign government and takes the soldier‘s oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent;
his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or
offenses.‖).
107 See, e.g., Lindh, 212 F. Supp.2d 541 (concluding that Lindh was not a lawful
combatant and was therefore not entitled to combatant immunity).
108 Although news reports talk of Israeli drone strikes, Israeli officials
generally maintain that drones are used only for reconnaissance and targeting
planning.
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combatants‘ privilege, therefore. In contrast, it is widely reported
that the CIA is the lead—perhaps sole—agency planning and
executing U.S. targeted strikes using armed drones in Pakistan.109
Neither intelligence agents nor contractors fall within the category
of combatant under LOAC. They are not members of regular
armed forces, civilians engaged in a levée en masse, or members of a
regular militia under responsible command, carrying arms openly,
wearing a distinctive emblem, and abiding by the laws of war.110
As a result, they do not enjoy the right to engage in hostilities
within the law of war and the concomitant immunity that
accompanies that right—combatant immunity. A person who
engages in hostilities without combatant status does not violate
LOAC per se, but does not enjoy the protection from prosecution
that combatant status provides.111 Thus, CIA agents or contractors
who launch UAV attacks can be subject to prosecution under the
domestic law of the countries where the attacks occur and would
not be protected by the LOAC principle of combatant immunity.112
A second, and closely related, issue that arises from nonmilitary personnel operating armed drones during armed conflict
is that such personnel can be liable to attack as a result of their

109 The extent of the hostilities between the United States and militants in
Pakistan, including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other groups, suggests
that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict in Pakistan. See Laurie R.
Blank & Benjamin R. Farley, Characterizing U.S. Operations in Pakistan: Is the United
States Engaged in an Armed Conflict?, 34 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 151, 151–52 (2011)
(considering whether the United States‘ involvement in Pakistan is an armed
conflict). In Yemen and Somalia, however, where the United States has also
employed UAV strikes against terrorist operatives, the United States is operating
within the international law of self-defense and is not engaged in an armed
conflict at this time, making the legal analysis, particularly regarding the status
and rights of persons, wholly different.
110 See GC III, supra note 27 (setting forth the categories of individuals entitled
to combatant status).
111 See Lindh, 212 F. Supp.2d 557–58 (noting that persons who engage in
hostilities without lawful combatant status do not have immunity from
prosecution under domestic law).
112 See Nathan Hodge, Drone Pilots Could Be Tried for “War Crimes,” Law Prof
Says, WIRED.COM (Apr. 28, 2010, 4:15 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom
/2010/04/drone-pilots-could-be-tried-for-war-crimes-law-prof-says/ (describing
how drone operators could be prosecuted in the country in which they carried out
the drone-related actions because these operators ―[are not] combatants in a legal
sense.‖).
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participation in hostilities.113 One of the central tenets of LOAC is
that civilians are immune from attack. Article 51(2) of Additional
Protocol I states: ―The civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.‖114 Direct
targeting of civilians is therefore strictly prohibited. But the
protection for civilians is significantly broader than protection
from direct attack. Article 51 sets the foundation for a framework
of protections to ensure that ―the civilian population and
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers
arising from military operations.‖115
However, the practical and functional needs of the law lead to
one important exception: direct participation in hostilities. Article
51(3) of Additional Protocol I sets forth this exception, stating that
―[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section,
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.‖116
In certain limited circumstances, therefore, civilians may be
directly
and
intentionally
targeted
during
hostilities,
notwithstanding their civilian status. As the Israeli Supreme Court
held in its 2006 Targeted Killings judgment,
A civilian who violates that law and commits acts of
combat does not lose his status as a civilian, but as long as
he is taking a direct part in hostilities he does not enjoy—
during that time—the protection granted to a civilian. He is
subject to the risks of attack like those to which a combatant
is subject, without enjoying the rights of a combatant, e.g.
those granted to a prisoner of war. True, his status is that
of a civilian, and he does not lose that status while he is
directly participating in hostilities. However, he is a
civilian performing the function of a combatant. As long as
he performs that function, he is subject to the risks which

113 See AP I, supra note 27, art. 51(3) (―Civilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities.‖).
114 Id. art. 51(2).
115 Id. art. 51(1).
116 Id. art. 51(3).
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that function entails and ceases to enjoy the protection
granted to a civilian from attack.117
From a practical standpoint, enabling civilians to engage in
hostilities but maintain their immunity from attack would upend
LOAC‘s delicate balance between military necessity and
humanity.118 Direct participation thus also comports with the basic
right of individual self-defense by recognizing that a soldier
engaged in conflict has the right to respond with force to someone
posing a threat, whether that person is a combatant or a civilian.
Although the parameters and definition of direct participation
in hostilities has been the subject of extensive debate, the nature of
the activities that intelligence operatives and contractors engage in
as part of UAV attacks fall squarely within the context of direct
participation in hostilities.119 Therefore, such persons lose their

117 See
Targeted Killings Case, 57(6) IsrSC 285, ¶ 31, available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf; see also
Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 178 (1998) (―Specifically, when civilians, such as
those who attacked the Tablada base, assume the role of combatants by directly
taking part in fighting, whether singly or as a member of a group, they thereby
become legitimate military targets.
As such, they are subject to direct
individualized attack to the same extent as combatants.‖) (emphasis omitted).
118 See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT‘L L. 795, 803 (2010)
(explaining the interplay between necessity and distinction).
119 See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgement, ¶ 177 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008)
(listing the following examples of direct participation in hostilities: ―bearing,
using or taking up arms, taking part in military or hostile acts, activities, conduct
or operations, armed fighting or combat, participating in attacks against enemy
personnel, property or equipment, transmitting military information for the
immediate use of a belligerent, transporting weapons in proximity to combat
operations, and serving as guards, intelligence agents, lookouts, or observers on
behalf of military forces‖) (citations omitted); MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE JOINT
SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 2004, JSP 383, at § 5.3.3 (U.K.)
[hereinafter U.K. MANUAL] (including amongst ―those taking a direct part in
hostilities . . . [c]ivilians manning an anti-aircraft gun or engaging in sabotage of
military installations‖); U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP
1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER‘S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, § 8.2.2 (2007) (―Direct participation in hostilities
must be judged on a case-by-case basis. Some examples include taking up arms
or otherwise trying to kill, injure, or capture enemy personnel or destroy enemy
property.‖). See also Interpretive Guidance, supra note 65, at 991 (noting that the
conduct of hostilities falls within the definition of direct participation in
hostilities).
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immunity from attack and can be targeted during armed conflict.
Direct participation in hostilities is not, in and of itself, a violation
of LOAC, however, and any civilians who engage in drone strikes
are not liable for violations of LOAC unless they launch those
attacks in violation of the law—such as deliberate targeting of
civilians, disproportionate or indiscriminate attacks, or a failure to
take precautions, for example.120 In the context of who operates
drones and launches or participates in attacks, the growing use of
armed drones does pose interesting questions regarding status and
the consequences of that status, with regard to the loss of both
immunity from attack and immunity from prosecution.
2.2. Geography of Attacks
Even a cursory reading of the front-page news from the past
several years demonstrates an expanding geography of UAV
attacks: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. Some
of these, such as in Afghanistan—and now Pakistan—and Libya,
fall within the generally recognized parameters of an armed
conflict.
Others, such as Yemen and Somalia, raise more
complicated questions regarding where force is being used and
what that means for the application of LOAC. A secondary part of
this inquiry is the difficulty of determining which groups form part
of the enemy in this armed conflict and which groups are separate
entities.
Some argue that the use of armed drones is extending the
battlefield to locales wherever UAV attacks against terrorist
operatives take place.121 Indeed, the United States has used drones
extensively beyond the existing conflict regions of Afghanistan and
Pakistan. In the first targeted killing after September 11, a CIA

120 See Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat‟l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov‟t Reform, 111th Cong. 27 (2010) (statement of David W. Glazier,
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles) (also arguing, however, that
under the legal theories adopted by our government in prosecuting Guantánamo
detainees, these CIA officers, as well as any higher level government officials who
have authorized or directed their attacks, are committing war crimes).
121 See Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat‟l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov‟t Reform, 111th Cong. 20 (2010) (statement of Mary Ellen
O‘Connell, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame) (arguing for strict rules
limiting the use of armed drones to legally determinable combat zones.).
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drone launched a Hellfire missile into southern Yemen, killing six
suspected al Qaeda members, including the man believed to be
responsible for the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole.122 More recently,
the United States used a drone strike to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, the
Muslim cleric who served as an operational commander of al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), who was suspected of
planning the failed attack against Britain‘s ambassador to Yemen
in April 2010, and who was allegedly involved in the Fort Hood
massacre of November 2009 and the attempted airline bombing on
Christmas Day 2009.123 In Somalia, as early as January 2007, the
United States launched attacks against al Qaeda members
suspected of involvement in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania.124 After multiple failed drone strikes
against Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the al Qaeda militant suspected of
masterminding the 2002 attack on the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa,
Kenya, the U.S. launched a commando raid in broad daylight,
killing Nabhan and at least eight others.125 And in June 2011, the
United States used an armed UAV to attack two senior members of
al-Shabab who had direct ties to al-Awlaki.126
122 See
Sources: U.S. Kills Cole Suspect, CNN.COM, Nov. 5, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/11/04/yemen.blast/index.html
(detailing how a CIA drone killed a terrorist bombing suspect). See also Alston
Report, supra note 25, ¶ 7 (noting the reported November 2002 attack in Yemen by
a CIA-operated drone).
123 See Con Coughlin & Philip Sherwell, American Drones Deployed to Target
Yemeni Terrorist, TELEGRAPH, MAY 2, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk
/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/7663661/American-drones-deployed-totarget-Yemeni-terrorist.html (detailing President Obama‘s authorization of the
assassination of al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, because of the radicalizing effect of his
sermons in addition to his operational role in AQAP).
124 See US „Targets al-Qaeda‟ in Somalia, BBC NEWS, Jan. 9, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6245943.stm (discussing U.S. air strikes
carried out in Somalia that killed at least nineteen people, and the concerns
expressed by Italy and the UN regarding the practical consequences of the U.S.
attacks).
125 See Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, American Raid in Somalia Kills Qaeda
Militant, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 15, 2009, at A1 (describing the helicopter attack on a
convoy carrying Nabhan and the leaders of Shabab, an Islamist group with ties to
al Qaeda that is fighting to overthrow Somalia‘s recognized government); Jeffrey
Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Forces Fire Missiles Into Somalia at a Kenyan, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A9 (describing a prior failed attempt to assassinate Nabhan
using Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from a submarine in the Arabian Sea).
126 See Greg Jaffe & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Drone Targets Two Leaders of Somali
Group Allied with Al Qaeda, Official Says, WASH. POST, June 29, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/us-drones-target-
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In response to the growing use of drones, some suggest that it
is ―easier‖ to send unmanned aircraft across sovereign borders
because there is no risk of a pilot being shot down and captured,
making the escalation and spillover of conflict more likely.127
Similarly, one might argue that it is easier to group more entities or
individuals within the category of ―enemy‖ because of the greater
ease in reaching them with drones.128 An armed drone is simply a
weapon, much like any other, and a weapon does not drive the
legal interpretation of what constitutes armed conflict and against
whom the conflict is being fought. To the extent that one country
engages in extensive UAV strikes against another state—creating
an international armed conflict—or against a non-state actor so as
to create a situation of protracted armed violence,129 then what was
an isolated UAV campaign against selected targets could morph
into an armed conflict.130 In the contemporary arena of a conflict
between states and non-state terrorist groups, the more complex
questions involve the consequences of UAV strikes for the
parameters of that conflict against terrorist groups—the extension
of an existing and admittedly hard-to-define conflict instead of the
creation of new conflicts.
The present conflict between the United States and al Qaeda
and affiliated terrorist groups poses significant, yet seemingly
fundamental, questions about not only the law applicable to
two-leaders-of-somali-group-allied-with-al-qaeda/2011/06/29
/AGJFxZrH_story.html (discussing U.S. drone attacks in Somalia against alShabab.).
127 See O‘Connell, supra note 23 (presenting evidence that the availability of
unmanned combat vehicles (UCVs) is lowering psychological and political
barriers to killing).
128 See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Is AQAP Part-and-Parcel of al Qaeda? Some New
Evidence, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 28, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com
/2011/08/is-aqap-part-and-parcel-of-al-qaeda-some-new-evidence/ (discussing
whether AQAP‘s request for Bin Laden‘s permission to install Anwar al-Awlaki
as AQAP‘s leader demonstrates that AQAP is ―part-and-parcel of ‗core‘ al Qaeda‖
for purposes of status under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)).
129 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (defining armed conflict as ―protracted armed violence
between . . . governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups within a State‖).
130 See Blank & Farley, supra note 109, at 188–89 (characterizing the United
States‘ engagement in Pakistan, including the use of unmanned drones, as an
armed conflict).
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operations against terrorists, but also about where the conflict is
taking place and where that law applies. Beyond the obvious areas
of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the border areas of Pakistan, there is, at
present, little agreement on where the battlefield is—that is, where
this conflict is taking place—and an equal measure of uncertainty
regarding when it started and how it might end. In traditional
conflicts, military operations could take place beyond the territory
of any neutral party.131 The law of neutrality generally ―defines the
relationship under international law between states engaged in an
armed conflict and those that are not participating in that
conflict.‖132
Neutrality law thus led to a geographic-based
framework in which belligerents can fight on belligerent territory
or the commons, but must refrain from any operations on neutral
territory. In essence, the battlespace in a traditional armed conflict
between two or more states is anywhere outside the sovereign
territory of any of the neutral states.133
Today‘s conflicts, however, pit states against non-state actors.
The latter are actors and groups who often do not have any
territorial nexus beyond wherever they can find safe haven free
from government intrusion. Once we are outside the belligerentneutral framework that defined the traditional battlespace,
determining the parameters of the contemporary battlefield or
zone of combat becomes significantly more complicated. Simply
superimposing the approach applicable in traditional armed
conflict onto conflicts with terrorist groups does not provide any
means for distinguishing between different conceptions of the
battlefield. In the past several years, arguments have centered on
whether there can be a global battlefield or whether the conflict
with al Qaeda is limited solely to Afghanistan.134 Just a few weeks
131 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 20 (4th ed. 2005)
(―In principle, all the territories of the belligerent States, anywhere under their
sovereign sway, are inside the region of war. As a corollary, the region of war
does not overstep the boundaries of neutral States, and no hostilities are permitted
within their respective domains.‖).
132 U.K. Manual, supra note 119, § 1.42.
133 See DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 26 (―[T]he region of war does not include
the territories of neutral States, and no hostilities are permissible within neutral
boundaries.‖).
134 See Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and
Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat, 39 GA. J. INT‘L
& COMP. L. 1, 20–21 (2010) (arguing for the use of factors drawn from LOAC in
analyzing the parameters of the battlefield in contemporary conflicts).
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after the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush laid
the foundation for the notion of the whole world as a battlefield
when he pronounced that ―our war on terror will be much broader
than the battlefields and beachheads of the past. This war will be
fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.‖135 When coupled
with statements by other high-ranking administration officials,136
the President‘s view of a global battlefield, in which the whole
world is a war zone, became clear. The Obama Administration has
not used the same language of a global battlefield, but has actually
significantly expanded the use of drone strikes outside of
The use of armed drones against terrorist
Afghanistan.137
operatives in Yemen and Somalia has driven debate about whether
those areas fall within the boundaries of the armed conflict with al
Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, whether any hostilities in
those areas constitute separate armed conflicts, or whether the
conflict against terrorists can indeed be a global one.138 To this
extent, the use of armed drones continues to generate extensive
discussion about where conflict against transnational non-state
actors occurs.

135 President George W. Bush, Radio Address of the President to the Nation,
(Sep. 29, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov
/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html.
136 See, e.g., Interview by Tony Snow with Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice
in
D.C.
(Nov.
10,
2002),
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly
_story/0,3566,69783,00.html. Secretary Rice explained, ―We‘re in a new kind of
war, and we‘ve made very clear that it is important that this new kind of war be
fought on different battlefields.‖ Id. See also Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of
Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 431, 444 (2010)
(noting that this view ―extend[s] the boundaries of the conflict to take in alQaeda‘s operations around the world‖) (quoting Anthony Dworkin, Beyond the
War on Terror: Towards a New Transatlantic Framework for Counterterrorism, 13 EUR.
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 1, 5 (2009)).
137 See Larisa Epatko, Controversy Surrounds Increased Use of U.S. Drone Strikes,
THE RUNDOWN, PBS NEWSHOUR, Oct. 10, 2011, http://www.pbs.org/newshour
/rundown/2011/10/drone-strikes-1.html (describing the exponential increase in
the use of drones under the Obama Administration and the accompanying
increase in civilian deaths).
138 See generally, Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case
Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT‘L
HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 3–6 (2010). See also Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made
Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A1 (discussing the legal
analysis allegedly conducted by the Obama Administration to determine the
lawfulness of killing Anwar al-Awlaki, and American citizen, on Yemen soil).
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2.3. Contemporary Challenges for Proportionality and Precautions
Drones do introduce additional interesting considerations into
the proportionality and precautions calculus as well. The very
capabilities that make drones an effective weapon with regard to
distinction, proportionality, and precautions can also have the
effect of actually changing the calculus for assessing a lawful
attack. In essence, drones may ―raise[] the bar of expectations,‖
creating a higher standard because of the ability to target more
precisely.139 A significant part of any analysis of the legality of an
attack relies on the notion of the ―reasonable commander‖ looking
at the situation from the perspective of the commander before the
attack. If drone capabilities alter what a reasonable commander
knows—or is expected to know—then we may see a shift in the
actual content of how distinction, proportionality, and precautions
are being interpreted in operations and after-the-fact. At first
glance, this shift can have positive effects: as parties continue to be
more precise and more demanding in their implementation of
LOAC, the ability to protect civilians will also increase. However,
such heightened standards can raise serious concerns. If using
drones means that a party faces different legal standards and
obligations than it would in the absence of drones, that party may
opt for a less precise weapon in order to avoid such heightened
standards. Here, civilians will likely bear the brunt of such
decisions, meaning that, overall, the use of drones in a way that
maximizes—but does not significantly alter—adherence to the
obligations of distinction, proportionality, and precautions is the
best way to carry out LOAC‘s central goals.
Second, as news reports have documented, the sheer volume
and pace of the information gathered by drones can be
overwhelming, sometimes to the point of detracting from efficient
military operations and decisionmaking.140 In 2009, ―Air Force
drones collected nearly three times as much video over
139 See Christopher Drew, Human Rights Group Says 29 Civilians Were Killed by
Israeli Air Attacks in Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/world/middleeast/01gaza.html (quoting
P.W. Singer, author of Wired for War).
140 See Christopher Drew, Military Is Awash in Data from Drones, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/business
/11drone.html?pagewanted=all (highlighting the challenges posed by excessive
information from drones).
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Afghanistan and Iraq . . . as in 2007‖ and are on course to increase
that yield exponentially.141 Reaper drones, the latest development
in drones, will soon be able to record video in over thirty directions
at once.142 The flood of information raises concerns about the
ability of analysts to cull the essential information for operational
decisionmaking, particularly in time-sensitive situations. For
example, investigations into a February 2010 attack in Afghanistan
suggested that information overload was responsible for the
mistaken targeting of civilians, including children.
In the
intelligence gathered from a UAV video feed and other sources:
There were solid reports that the group included children,
but the team did not adequately focus on them amid the
swirl of data . . . . The team was under intense pressure to
protect American forces nearby, and in the end it
determined, incorrectly, that the villagers‘ convoy posed an
imminent threat, resulting in one of the worst losses of
civilian lives in the war in Afghanistan.143
Although the data that drones can gather is a critical tool for
effective proportionality analyses and contributes greatly to
LOAC-compliant targeting, it is important to recognize the limits
of data analysis as well. As one U.S. military commander explains,
―You need somebody who‘s trained and is accountable in
recognizing that that is a woman, that is a child and that is
someone who‘s carrying a weapon . . . [a]nd the best tools for that
are still the eyeball and the human brain.‖144 Furthermore, given
that proportionality rests on a reasonable commander‘s
determination based on the information available to him at the
time of the attack, we must consider whether drones at some point
will no longer add to that process but could actually impede that
process simply because of the flood of information.
A final development to consider regarding drones and
proportionality is whether the use of armed drones and their
heightened capabilities is altering the interpretation—and thus
Id.
Id.
143 Thom Shanker & Matt Richtel, In New Military, Data Overload Can Be
Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/01/17/technology/17brain.html?pagewanted=all.
144 Drew, Military is Awash, supra note 140.
141
142
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implementation—of the principle of proportionality altogether. As
noted above, proportionality requires that civilian casualties not be
excessive; it does not require that there be no civilian casualties at
all. The combination of counterinsurgency strategy and UAV
capabilities in Afghanistan has led to a growing perception that
any civilian deaths are unlawful. Strategic policy and mission
imperatives may well seek to eliminate civilian casualties as much
as possible, particularly in counterinsurgency, and drones offer
highly precise targeting capabilities. The confluence of these two
factors has often seemed to suggest that proportionality in the
context of UAV strikes is being, or could soon be, reconfigured,
that we are seeing a recalibration of the relationship between
military advantage and civilian casualties—away from ―excessive‖
and towards ―none.‖ In essence, if the notion of ―information
reasonably available to the commander‖ becomes ―perfect
information,‖ then we would begin to see a trend away from the
concept of proportionality as we now know it and toward a more
strict liability standard of targeting analysis in which ―zero
casualties‖ is the standard.145 Beyond the fact that a zero casualty
rate is impossible unless all persons in the combat zone are
considered to be legitimate targets (an extraordinarily dangerous
conclusion), this change in the proportionality standard raises
significant concerns.146 In particular, a military force held to such a
zero casualty standard will either disregard the law entirely as
unreasonable or will refrain from military operations altogether to
avoid legal violations. Both options leave innocent civilians—
LOAC‘s true constituency—unprotected and in danger.
3.

CONCLUSION

The novelty and hi-tech nature of unmanned aircraft launching
missiles at targets without risk of retaliation has led to extensive
moral, philosophical, political, strategic, and legal debates

145 See, e.g., Shane, supra note 10, at A11 (quoting Obama‘s top counterterrorism advisor, John O. Brennan, as claiming a zero casualty rate in Pakistan:
―there hasn‘t been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency,
precision of the capabilities we‘ve been able to develop‖).
146 See Laurie R. Blank, Drone Strike Casualties and the Laws of War, JURIST (Aug.
22,
2011),
http://jurist.org/forum/2011/08/laurie-blank-drone-strikes.php
(contending that the CIA‘s claim of zero civilian casualties raises potential serious
legal and policy questions about drone strikes).
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regarding the use of such weapons.147 Lauded as highly precise
and discriminating weapons, decried as ―killer robots,‖148 drones
are at the center of contentious debates about the moral and ethical
underpinnings of conflict. These debates go beyond their direct
effects—namely, civilian casualties in the course of attacks against
terrorist targets—to questions about the psychological effects on
the civilian population living with drones buzzing overhead and
launching missiles seemingly without warning.149 From a legal
perspective, drones offer a useful lens through which to view both
traditional LOAC principles and questions specifically raised in
contemporary conflicts. In particular, they have great potential for
heightened implementation of the key principles of distinction,
proportionality and precautions in attack. As a recent report by
the U.K. Ministry of Defence explains:
[T]he greater situational awareness provided by the sensors
on a persistent unmanned aircraft that observes the
battlespace for long, uninterrupted, periods . . . enables
better decision making and more appropriate use of force.
This is enhanced by the fact that the decision-maker is in
the relatively stress-free environment of an air-conditioned
cabin instead of in a fast jet cockpit.150
Use of armed drones continues to raise serious questions about
the numbers and nature of civilian casualties, but these questions
stem primarily from the procedures for selecting targets and
approving attacks,151 not from the nature and capabilities of drones
147 See generally USING TARGETED KILLING TO FIGHT THE WAR ON TERROR (Claire
Finkelstein et al. eds., forthcoming 2012).
148 William Saletan, Predators Need Editors, SLATE (Apr. 25, 2011, 8:08 AM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2292062.
149 See Smith, supra note 8 (reporting the psychological toll that repeated
drone strikes have had on people living in Pakistan‘s tribal regions). Some might
suggest that UAV attacks constitute attacks that spread terror among the civilian
population, in violation of Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I. However, the
crime of spreading terror among the civilian population requires specific intent,
which is not demonstrated in the case of UAV attacks. See Prosecutor v. Galic,
Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 162 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (―[T]he crime of terror contains the distinct
material element of ‗primary purpose of spreading terror.‘‖).
150 MINISTRY OF DEF., THE UK APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS,
2011, J. Doctrine Note 2/11, ¶ 519.
151 See supra Part 1.2.
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themselves. As with any other weapon, it is essential to ensure
that UAV attacks are launched only against legitimate military
objectives in accordance with the obligations of proportionality
and precautions.
The nature of today‘s conflicts and the way in which armed
drones are employed do introduce some concerns about how
drones and their capabilities are affecting the interpretation,
implementation, and development of LOAC. News reports show
that the U.S. drone program, particularly in Pakistan, involves
significant civilian participation, which raises questions regarding
the status and privileges of persons launching attacks. Drone
campaigns against al Qaeda and other terrorist operatives beyond
the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan have contributed
substantially to questions regarding the geographical parameters
of armed conflict, particularly conflict with transnational non-state
actors and the challenges of understanding who is part of an
enemy group for the purposes of targeting and detention.
Finally, notwithstanding the extensive capabilities drones offer
in the areas of distinction, proportionality and precautions, current
developments demonstrate that drones also pose some potential
risks to the development and interpretation of the law in ways that
could endanger the central goal of protecting civilians and
conducting hostilities in a lawful manner. Counterinsurgency
strategy and mission imperatives appropriately seek to eliminate
civilian casualties as much as possible in the fight for ―hearts and
minds.‖ But international law does not require no civilian
casualties; indeed, the law accepts that there will be incidental
casualties from lawful attacks—a tragic but not criminal
consequence of war. The combination of drones‘ highly precise
targeting capabilities and strategic needs to reduce civilian
casualties has led to a growing—and mistaken—perception that
any civilian deaths are unlawful. It may seem that innocent
civilians will be the beneficiaries of this development; in fact, the
opposite could well be true. To the extent that drones thus begin
to alter interpretations of distinction, proportionality, and
precautions, the results may not be as protective for civilians as
anticipated. A military force facing such a zero casualty standard
will either disregard the law entirely as unreasonable, endangering
civilians in the combat zone, or will refrain from military
operations altogether to avoid legal violations, leaving its own
citizens undefended from attacks. Both options leave innocent
civilians unprotected and in danger. As a result, analyzing drones
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as a weapon and the nature of drone strikes—from target
acquisition to strike—within existing interpretations of LOAC is
critical to ensuring and enhancing civilian protections in wartime.
Maximizing capabilities and effective decisionmaking is the most
straightforward way to carrying out LOAC‘s key goals and
principles.
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